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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
ROBERT L. HEYWOOD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 
8508 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff, Robert L. Heywood, commenced this suit in 
the District Court of Salt Lake County on December 11, 
1954, to recover for injuries sustained in The Denver and 
Rio Grande Western Railroad Company's blacksmith shop 
at Salt Lake City, Utah, on November 23, 1953. The com-
plaint alleges a cause of action under the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act grounded on alleged negligent failure 
of defendant to furnish plaintiff a reasonably safe place to 
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work and other specific acts and omissions of negligence. 
The defendant's answer denies negligence and affirmatively 
alleges that plaintiff's accident and injuries were caused 
by his own negligence. 
The case came on for trial before the Honorable David 
T. Lewis on January 23, 1956, sitting with a jury. A jury 
verdict was returned on January 24, 1956, in favor of plain-
tiff and against defendant assessing damages in the total 
amount of $13,000.00. The trial court denied a motion by 
defendant for a directed verdict. Judgment was entered on 
the verdict on January 25, 1956. 
Thereafter, defendant made a motion for a new trial 
on the grounds, among others, of errors in law committed 
by the court in its instructions to the jury. Said motion 
was heard and argued on May 13, 1956. The trial court 
denied said motion. 
Whereupon, defendant commenced this appeal assign-
ing as error the following: 
1. Denial of defendant's motion for directed verdict. 
2. Error in the trial court's instructions to the jury 
including denial of certain of defendant's requested instruc-
tions. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff, Robert L. Heywood, was 63 years of age 
at the time of trial. His lifetime occupation was that of a 
railroad machinist (R. 13). He had worked for The Denver 
and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company as a machinist 
since November 2, 1922. His duties as a machinist con-
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sisted of repair and maintenance of machines and equip-
ment including work in the railroad blacksmith shop. He 
was generally familiar with the blacksmith shop and had 
worked in it since 1922 (R. 14). He styled himself a "trou-
ble shooter." He testified that the work of a trouble shooter 
was to repair any machine used by the railroad whethe,r 
it be a steam hammer or truck or whatever else it might 
be (R. 15). Part of his duties consisted of determining the 
cause of trouble and correcting the same (R. 43, 44). Mr. 
Heywood was a senior mechanic at the time of his accident 
(R. 57). He testified that he. knew of no one more exper-
ienced than himself in working with equipment nor more 
qualified to inspect the type of equipment involved in his 
accident (R. 57, 58). He had replaced packing in the stuff-
ing boxes on hammers on numerous occasions (R. 29). He 
had worked on the stuffing box involved in this accident 
four or five times before the accident (R. 131). 
Plaintiff's accident occurred in defendant's blacksmith 
shop at the site of what is known as the single arch steam 
hammer at approximately 11:45 a. m., November 23, 1953 
(R. 2, 16). The blacksmith shop is a large, high ceiling 
building used to house hammers and other blacksmith 
equipment utilized in maintenance repair work. It is located 
approximately 750 feet from the railroad boiler room (R. 
19, 20). 
The single arch hammer involved in the accident is 
shown in Exhibits 1, 2 and 3. These exhibits were identi-
fied by plaintiff (R. 16). The single arch hammer is a 
large piece of equipment used to fashion large pieces of 
metal taken from the forges. The hammer is located on a 
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cement slab in the blacksmith shop. The part of the ham-
mer upon which the metal is placed is known as the die 
(R. 18). Metal is placed on the die with tongs. Operation 
of the hammer is controlled by two levers. One lever con-
trols the stroke and the other lever controls the steam. The 
hammer is powered by steam (R. 18). 
Steam is made in the power house located about one 
block from the blacksmith shop. There are three steam 
boilers in the power house (R. 19). A main steam line runs 
from the boilers in the power house to various localities, 
one of which is the blacksmith shop (R. 19, 20). A system 
of three-inch standard pipes are used to carry the steam. 
A main steam line runs from the power house into the 
blacksmith shop and along the ceiling of the blacksmith 
shop to the center thereof. A feeder line extends from the 
center of the blacksmith shop to the single arch hammer. 
An intermediate shutoff valve is located at the center of 
the blacksmith shop and controls the supply of steam to 
the hammer (R. 93). Another shutoff valve is located 
about two feet from the hammer (R. 9-1). 
Exhibits 1, 2 and 3 show the end of the steam pipe 
connecting with the single arch hammer. 
The steam pipe (from the point of supply) connects 
with the single arch hammer at a point approximately 12 
feet from the ground (R. 21). The connection is enclosed 
in a stuffing box. The stuffing box is approximately two 
feet from the closest shutoff valve (R. 21). The stuffing 
box is used because of vibration. A rigid connection be-
tween the steam line and the machine would be impractic-
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able because of vibration. The purpose of the stuffing box 
is to provide a flexible joint (R. 21). The steam pipe lead-
ing into the stuffing box (from the point of supply) has 
a collar or flange on the end. Asbestos hemp packing is 
placed upon and around the collar and held tight by a gland 
to prevent steam leaking (R. 21). Exhibit 4 was identified 
at the time of trial and admitted in evidence as a model of 
a stuffing box and the pipe leading into it (R. 24). The 
gland fits around the pipe and is attached and held in place 
by four bolts ( R. 25) . The asbestos hemp packing has to 
be replaced from time to time as it deteriorates with use 
(R. 26). 
The evidence was uncontradicted that the end of the 
pipe with the collar leading into the stuffing box could 
not come out of the attached gland without the collar break-
ing (R. 30, 32, 68). A break in the collar could not be 
detected by looking at the pipe from outside of the stuffing 
box (R. 84, 113). The stuffing box concealed the collar. 
A break at the joint of the collar could not be detected ex-
cept by removing the pipe leading into the stuffing box 
(from the source of supply) (R. 69, 70, 78, 138). 
With this setting in mind, we turn to the facts sur-
rounding the accident. 
On the morning of the accident, lVIr. Lewis Morgan 
Griffiths, a blacksmith in defendant's shop, had been work-
ing on the single arch hammer. He discovered that there 
was a steam leak in the hammer and reported it to Mr. 
Paul Schenk, the foreman (R. 87, 150). Mr. Schenk noti-
fied the plaintiff to repair the leak (R. 150, 15). According 
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to plaintiff, Mr. Schenk told him to go out and fix the leak 
on the hammer (R. 16). Plaintiff commenced work on the 
hammer at approximately 10:30 a. m. (R. 47). Plaintiff 
had a helper to assist him in doing whatever was necessary 
in the course of his work (R. 47, 48). There were other 
men to help if help was needed (R. 48). There were also 
four pipe fitters available on the day of the accident to 
help if needed (R. 109). Plaintiff had a Ys-inch S wrench 
and a 14-inch Stillson wrench with him. There were lad-
ders, scaffolds and other equipment available in the shop 
to do the work (R. 49). 
When plaintiff approached the stuffing box on the 
single arch hammer, he observed that it was leaking so 
badly that new packing would be required (R. 26). Plain-
tiff turned off the valve closest to the machine (R. 27). 
He took the gland off the stuffing box and slid it back onto 
the pipe. He took out one ring of the packing and dis-
covered the size packing required. Mr. Schenk was not 
in the blacksmith shop at that time (R. 27). Mter some 
delay, plaintiff found the packing he needed and returned 
to the hammer (R. 28). He placed the new packing in the 
stuffing box, replaced the gland and tightened the gland 
to what he thought was the proper tension. He was stand-
ing on a ladder about six feet from the ground. He then 
turned on the valve letting steam through the line (R. 29). 
As he started down the ladder, the steam pipe going into 
the stuffing box blew out and hit him on the left hand. 
The pipe came out of the stuffing box. Plaintiff fell and 
hit the floor. He was standing when he landed with the 
weight on his left leg (R. 30). Other workmen came to 
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his assistance. He did not have an opportunity thereafter 
to examine the stuffing box or the pipe (R. 31). 
On cross-examination plaintiff admitted that one of 
his duties was to inspect the work to see if it was done 
satisfactorily (R. 43, 44). He admitted that part of his 
job was to determine the trouble and to correct it (R. 44). 
He admitted that he made no effort to ascertain if the 
collar on the pipe was broken (R. 45, 46, 47, 55, 58). He 
didn't know whether the collar was broken or not (R. 37). 
He made no examination to see the condition of the collar 
before he tightened the gland (R. 68). 
Plaintiff denied any knowledge of the existence or 
function of the intermediate valve (R. 50, 51, 52). He 
admitted that he had tried to tighten the gland and had 
tightened it all the way without success (R. 54, 55). He 
admitted that there was no better opportunity to inspect the 
equipment than when same was dismantled and that he 
had not made an inspection at that time (R. 56). He ad-
mitted that he had not asked any one to make an inspection 
at the time the stuffing box was dismantled (R. 56). He 
did not arrange to have a pipe fitter take the pipe off and 
inspect it (R. 84). He testified that it was not too big a 
job to dismantle the pipe (R. 84). He admitted that steam 
fitters were not so far away that one could not be obtained 
(R. 84). He admitted that if he saw something requiring 
a steam fitter that he could call his supervisor (R. 85). 
He admitted that he never went to the supervisor on this 
occasion to tell him to have a steam fitter examine the pipe, 
although on other occasions he had done so (R. 85). 
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There was no evidence offered or received that any-
one other than plaintiff ever went up to the stuffing box 
and examined the condition. Presumably plaintiff was in 
a better position than anyone else to determine the trouble 
and decide what work should be done and what assistance 
obtained. 
One of defendant's witnesses, Mr. Paul Schenk, fore-
man, testified that it was the machinist's job in the first 
instance to inspect the machine to see what had to be done 
(R. 151, 157). This testimony was not disputed by plain-
tiff despite the fact that plaintiff was recalled after Mr. 
Schenk testified. There was no evidence of any custom 
or practice for a steam fitter to precede a machinist in an 
examination of equipment nor for a steam fitter to ac-
company a machinist to the work. 
One of the witnesses called by defendant was James 
Everett Aberton, Division Locomotive Foreman (R. 135, 
136) . Mr. Aberton arrived at the scene of the accident 
shortly thereafter. He examined the pipe and collar in-
volved in the accident. At the trial he identified Exhibit 
6 as the pipe and collar involved in the accident (R. 136, 
137). Mr. Aberton found that there was an old break be-
tween the collar and the pipe all the way around the pipe 
except for approximately %~-inch (R. 37). He was able 
to determine that the break was old because of discoloration 
(R. 156). He stated that it was his opinion that there was 
just a thread holding the pipe to the collar at the time Mr. 
Heywood was performing his work (R. 137, 138). He 
stated that the break in the collar would account for the 
steam leak (R. 138, 139). He testified that the stress 
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exerted by tightening the gland might be sufficient to break 
the remaining portion of the pipe from the collar (R. 142). 
Plaintiff called witness Joseph L. Crowton. Mr. Crow-
ton was an experienced sheet metal worker and pipe fitter 
(R. 100, 101). Mr. Crowton examined Exhibit 6, the pipe 
and collar, at the time of trial. He testified that he had 
seen the pipe on the single arch hammer a good many times 
(R. 111). He testified that from his experience he could 
look at the break between the collar and pipe and determine 
whether it was a fresh or old break because of rust. He 
testified that the break appeared to him to be of old dura-
tion except for a distance of approximately o/s-inch. This 
was based on the rust which appeared on the break ( R. 
111). Mr. Crowton testified that little pressure would be 
required to separate the collar from the pipe with such a 
large break (R. 113). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDI-
CIAL ERROR IN ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 6 
WHICH IMPOSED ABSOLUTE LIABILITY ON 
DEFENDANT. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDI-
CIAL ERROR IN ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
WHICH INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON A 
THEORY CONTRARY TO AND NOT SUP-
PORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
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POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDI-
CIAL ERROR IN ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
WHICH INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON A 
THEORY NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVI-
DENCE. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDI-
CIAL ERROR IN ITS REFUSAL AND FAIL-
URE TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 1, 8 AND 11 OR SOME 
INSTRUCTION SETTING FORTH IN FULL 
THE THEORIES CONTAINED THEREIN. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDI-
CIAL ERROR IN FAILING AND REFUSING 
TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED IN-
STRUCTION NO. 6 OR SOME OTHER IN-
STRUCTION INCORPORATING THE THEORY 
CONTAINED THEREIN. 
POINT VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDI-
CIAL ERROR IN FAILING AND REFUSING 
TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED IN-
STRUCTION NO. 2. 
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POINT VII. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED 
VERDICT; THE EVIDENCE COMPELS THE 
CONCLUSION THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NEG-
LIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW AND THAT 
HIS NEGLIGENCE WAS THE SOLE PROXI-
MATE CAUSE OF HIS ACCIDENT AND IN-
JURIES. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDI-
CIAL ERROR IN ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 6 
WHICH IMPOSED ABSOLUTE LIABILITY ON 
DEFENDANT. 
Instruction Number Six reads as follows : 
"It is the duty of the defendant railroad com-
pany to exercise reasonable care to provide its em-
ployees with a reasonably safe place to work. This 
duty does not require the absolute elimination of 
all danger, but it does require the elimination of all 
dangers which the exercise of reasonable care by 
the defendant railroad company would remove or 
guard against. 
"In this connection you are instructed that if 
you shall find from a preponderance of the evidence 
that plaintiff at the time of his injury was perform-
ing the duties of his employment and that the de-
fendant failed to exercise reasonable care to make 
said place reasonably safe for the performance of 
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such duties in that the position of the plaintiff in 
connection with his duties and the operation of ap-
pliances used in the performance of his duties were 
such that the plaintiff was not performing his duties 
in a place of reasonable safety, then you are in-
structed that you may find the defendant negligent 
in such regard; and if you further find from a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that such negligence on 
the part of the defendant, if any, proximately caused 
in whole or in part injuries to plaintiff, then you 
should return a verdict in favor of plaintiff and 
against the defendant and award to plaintiff dam-
ages as in these instructions set forth." (Emphasis 
Added.) 
This instruction must be considered in light of the 
well-settled principles establishing a railroad's duty under 
the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Liability under the 
Act is predicated upon common law negligence. As stated 
by this court in the recent decision, Clifton M. Bowden v. 
The Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, 3 
Utah 2d 444, 286 P. 2d 240: 
"* * * We recognized then, and do now, 
that 'the Federal Act does not make the railroad 
an (absolute) insurer * * * the Act imposes 
liability for negligent injuries. * * *' The test 
to be applied in determining negligence is that of 
reasonable care. * * * 'Ye also expressly rec-
ognized therein the necessity of actual or construc-
tive knowledge, stating at page 334 of 233 P. 2d that 
a defendant employer 'is charged with responsibil-
ity for conditions of danger * * * of which it 
either has actual knowledge or is charged with con-
structive knowledge. * * *'" 
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And in Lasagna v. McCarthy, 111 Utah 269, 177 P. 2d 
734, 741, this court said: 
"A recent case in point is that of McGivern v. 
Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 132 F. 2d 213, at page 217, 
wherein the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals stated the 
rule in these words: '* * * The duty of provid-
ing a reasonably safe place in which to work and 
reasonably safe appliances with which to work while 
a continuing one does not obligate the employer to 
keep the place of work safe at every moment where 
such safety may depend on the due performance of 
work by the servant and his fellow workmen. Kreigh 
v. Westinghouse C., K. & Co., 214 U. S. 249, 29 S. Ct. 
619, 53 L. Ed. 984. In fact the rule is held not to be 
applicable where the workmen in the progress of 
their work render the place unsafe. Torgerson v. 
Minneapolis, St. P. & S. (S.) M. Ry. Co., 49 N. D. 
1096, 194 N. W. 741; Cartwright v. Atchison, T. & 
S. F. Ry. Co., 8 Cir., 228 F. 872. Temporary condi-
tions created by employees using or failing to use 
appliances furnished by the employer are not defects 
for which the employer may be held responsible in 
damages * * * ' For additional authority on 
this point, see Morgan Construction Co. v. Frank, 
6 Cir., 158 F. 964; and Medina Valley Irrigation Co. 
v. Espino, 5 Cir., 214 F. 732. 
"Negligence of the employer being the basis for 
recovery under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 
it is well to return to the ordinary definition of the 
term, which is (the omission to do something which 
a reasonable person guided by those considerations 
which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human af-
fairs, would do; or the doing of something which 
a prudent person under like circumstances would 
not do. Viewing the appellants' conduct in the light 
of this rule, we are unable to find anything in this 
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record which in any way indicates that they omitted 
to do that which they should have done; or that they 
did that which they ought not to have done." 
It is thus settled that to render an employer liable it 
must be made to appear by the evidence that the employer 
knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have 
known of an unsafe condition and knew or should have 
known that the condition exposed its employees to an un-
reasonable risk of harm. It is fundamental to common law 
negligence, that not every risk of harm gives rise to liabil-
ity; the risk must be unreasonable when viewed in light 
of all circumstances. 
The material facts which bear upon this point are as 
follows : Plaintiff was, according to his own testimony, an 
experienced machinist, having worked in the defendant's 
machine shop since 1922. He was a "trouble shooter." He 
knew when sent to perform the tasks out of which his 
accident arose that there was a leak in the steam pipe 
which required repairs. The manner of making repairs 
was left to his discretion. Plaintiff had full discretion to 
select tools and equipment. Ladders and scaffolds were 
readily available. Plaintiff's accident and injuries were 
caused by an old break in the collar of a steam pipe. At 
all tin1es prior to the accident the said collar on the pipe 
was concealed by a stuffing box which housed the collar 
connection. Both plaintiff's witness and defendant's wit-
ness testified that the break in the collar appeared of old 
duration. The break in the pipe was one which could not 
have been detected without removing the pipe. The break 
was not known to or detected by plaintiff in the course of 
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his work. (Statement of Facts.) If there was anything 
unsafe about plaintiff's place of work it was the condition 
of said pipe. 
It is the defendant's contentions that under these cir-
cumstances defendant would not be liable to plaintiff unless 
defendant knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should 
have known of the unsafe condition and knew or in the 
exercise of reasonable care should have known that plain-
tiff was being exposed to an unreasonable risk of harm. 
Further, as stated in the Lasagna and M eGivern decisions, 
supra, the defendant would not be liable for temporary 
conditions created by plaintiff using or failing to use ap-
. pliances furnished by defendant. 
Instruction Number 6 is, considered in its best light, 
an ambiguous and confusing instruction. The opening 
paragraph of the instruction states an abstract proposition 
of law. The second paragraph requires a grammatical 
diagram to ascertain its meaning. If any sensible meaning 
can be given said paragraph, it is as follows: 
"If plaintiff was performing his duties and de-
fendant failed to exercise reasonable care in that 
the position of plaintiff was such that plaintiff was 
not in a place of reasonable safety then defendant 
was negligent." 
It is the appellant's contention that the underlined 
words "in that" qualify and restrict the meaning of the 
preceding parts of the instruction. The same words have 
been so construed in the following decisions : 
Fraee v. Long Beach City High School, 58 C. A. 
2d 566, 137 P. 2d 60. 
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Textile Work v. Richards, 245 Ala. 37, 15 S. 2d 
578. 
As stated by this court in University of Utah v. Rich-
ards, 20 Utah 457, 59 Pac. 96 in construing a Statute: 
"* * * Particular provisions relating to a 
former subject must govern in relation to that sub-
ject, as against general provisions in another part 
of the law which might otherwise be broad enough 
to include it. * * *" 
This charge places the whole emphasis on whether the 
place of work was safe rather than whether defendant 
failed to exercise reasonable care. The charge instructs the 
jury that defendant might be found negligent if plaintiff 
was not performing his duties in a place of reasonable 
safety-irrespective of whether the defendant knew or 
should have known of the unsafe condition, whether defen-
dant knew or should have known that the condition gave 
rise to an unreasonable risk and whether defendant had 
reasonable opportunity to correct said situation and failed 
to do so. Under this instruction the jury might have found 
the defendant liable even though it believed that the de-
fendant did not know and would not in the exercise of rea-
sonable care have known of the unsafe condition, did not 
know and should not have realized an unreasonable risk, and 
did not have an opportunity to correct the condition. Under 
this instruction the jury could find the defendant liable even 
though it believed from the evidence that the defendant 
exercised reasonable care to correct the only unsafe con-
dition of which it knew by sending plaintiff to perform 
repairs. 
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For the reasons stated the said instruction, ambiguous 
as it is, contains a statement which is contrary to the law. 
It could tend only to confuse and mislead the jury. 
Appellant is fully aware of the rule which requires 
that instructions be read and considered as a whole. The 
question is whether the error contained in the second para-
graph of Instruction 6 is saved by the first paragraph 
or by the general definition of negligence contained else-. 
where in the instructions. The difficulty with this latter 
suggestion is that the second paragraph may be construed 
to qualify and restrict all other parts of the instructions. 
It would be entirely reasonable for a jury to apply such a 
construction. It must be assumed that the jury read and 
considered this instruction; and that the jurors may have 
believed that if they found that plaintiff was performing 
the duties of his employment and was not in a place of 
reasonable safety that they might find defendant negligent. 
In final analysis the question is not whether the jury 
did in fact construe the instructions as aforesaid; the ques-
tion is whether the jury may have construed the instruc-
tions in such manner to the prejudice of defendant. If the 
jury may have been thus mislead the error is clear and 
prejudicial. 
There are a number of decisions, Federal and State, 
in which instructions, similar to the instruction in question, 
have been considered and held prejudicially erroneous. 
Seaboard Airline Railway v. Horton, 233 U. S. 492 
(1914), 34 Sup. Ct. 365, was a suit under the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act founded upon failure to provide a 
safe place to work. Plaintiff alleged that the· defendant 
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was negligent, among other reasons, for failure to provide 
him with a safe place to work in that the defendant furn-
ished him with a locomotive engine not equipped with a 
glass plate between the engineer's seat in the engine and 
the boiler pressure gauge. The evidence was conflicting. 
The case was submitted to a jury with verdict for plaintiff. 
Judgment was entered on the verdict. Upon appeal by 
defendant to the Supreme Court of North Carolina, judg-
ment was affirmed. Appeal was taken to the Supreme 
Court of the United States. Defendant assigned as error 
certain instructions given by the trial court and the denial 
of certain requested instructions. One of the instructions 
was similar to the instruction given in the instant case: 
"* * * It is the duty of the defendant to pro-
vide a reasonably safe place for the plaintiff to work 
and to furnish him with reasonably safe appliances 
with which to do the work. * * * If you find 
from the evidence that it (the locomotive engine) 
was turned over to him without the guard and if you 
further find from the evidence that the guard was a 
proper safety provision for the use of that gauge 
and that it was unsafe without it, then the defendant 
did not furnish him a safe place and a safe appliance 
to do his work, and if it remained in that condition 
it was continuing negligence on the part of the de-
fendant, and if he was injured in consequence there-
of, if you so find by the greater weight of the evi-
dence, you should answer the first issue 'Yes.'" 
The Supreme Court of the United States held that the 
instruction constituted prejudicial error. The court said 
that the jury was, in effect, erroneously instructed that the 
absence of the guard glass was conclusive evidence of de-
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fendant's negligence. Likewise in this case the instruction 
charges the jury that if the plaintiff was in an unsafe place, 
defendant was negligent. 
In Atlantic Coastline Railroad Company v. Dixon, 189 
F. 2d 525 (1951 cert. den. 72 Sup. Ct. 54, 342 U. S. 830), 
a similar instruction was held erroneous. The instruction 
read: 
"* * * 'I charge you, Gentlemen of the jury, 
as a matter of law, if you find that the defendant 
company required its servant, C. C. Dixon, to work 
in a place which the railroad or its foreman knew to 
be unsafe, or which the foreman in the exercise of 
reasonable prudence ought to have known was un-
safe, then the defendant is liable for the injuries to 
its servant if those injuries resulted from an unsafe 
and dangerous place to work, as alleged in the plain-
tiff's petition, and it would be your duty to return 
a verdict for the plaintiff.' " 
The court pinpointed the error as follows: 
"This charge is faulty in that it presents, as the 
sole criterion of liability, knowledge of the employer 
or its representative that the place or tools provided 
for the employee's use were unsafe, rather than the 
failure on the part of the employer to exercise rea-
sonable care and prudence to that end, which is the 
recognized test. It should be modified to correctly 
state the duty of the employer as hereinabove de-
fined. * * *" 
Another case involving the same question is Hat field 
v. Thompson, 252 S. W. 2d 534 (Missouri 1952). That was 
an action brought under the Federal Employers' Liability 
Act. Plaintiff sustained injuries tripping over a hole in a 
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path adjoining defendant's railroad tracks. Plaintiff al-
leged failure to provide a safe place to work. The case was 
tried to a jury with verdict and judgment for plaintiff. 
Defendant appealed claiming error in instructions. The 
court's instruction number 1 permitted the jury to find that 
defendant was negligent if a hole existed on the right of 
way. None of the court's instructions required a finding 
that defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the 
defective condition. The Missouri Supreme Court held that 
the instruction constituted prejudicial error : 
"Neither of the instructions submitting plain-
tiff's case required the jury to find that defendant 
had actual or constructive knowledge of the exist-
ence of the hole under which plaintiff's foot allegedly 
slid. Such knowledge, actual or constructive, is un-
questionably a prerequisite of defendant's liability. 
* * * 
* * * * 
"In this case we have held that the mere re-
quirement of a finding that the existence of the hole 
was negligence was not the equivalent of the re-
quired finding of knowledge. The instructions 
omitted such a finding and were therefore preju-
dicially erroneous. * * *" 
Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, et al. v. Burks, 196 
Ark. 1104, 121 S. ,V. 2d 65, was a suit brought by a rail-
road employee against his employer for damages for per-
sonal injuries. Plaintiff claimed defendant negligently 
failed to provide a safe place to work. Plaintiff's injuries 
resulted from falling through a faulty and weakened floor 
in a freight car. Appeal was taken by defendant from a 
verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Instruction number 4 
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charged the jury that if it found the floor of the freight 
car was in an unsafe condition, which was known or by the 
exercise of ordinary care should have been known by de-
fendant that defendant was negligent. 
The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the instruction 
was erroneous : 
"Effect of this instruction was to tell the jury 
that if the floor of the freight car was in an unsafe 
or defective condition for loading bricks, there was 
negligence upon the part of appellants. 
"Whether conduct in a given case amounts to 
negligence is ordinarily a question for the jury. In 
the controversy at bar, knowledge by appellants that 
there were holes in the floor of the car, or the act 
of appellants with or without knowledge that it was 
in an unsafe condition-if, in fact, it was unsafe._ 
in furnishing such car, would be evidence of negli-
gence. * * * The error is that the instruction 
invades the province of the jury." 
In Stevens v. Mirakian, 177 Va. 123, 12 S. E. 2d 780, 
a similar instruction was held by the Supreme Court of 
Appeals of Virginia to constitute prejudicial error. That 
was a suit by an employee against her employer for injur-
ies sustained during the course of her employment. Al-
though not a Federal Employers' Liability case, plaintiff's 
recovery was there predicated, as here, upon an employer's 
common law duty to exercise reasonable care to provide 
a safe place to work. The plaintiff recovered a verdict. 
The trial court instructed the jury that if it found that 
the plaintiff was performing the duties of her employment 
and was injured due to a defective condition of a chair on 
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which she was resting then its verdict must be for plain-
tiff. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the instruc-
tion constituted prejudicial error: 
"No instruction was given the jury telling them 
that it was essential that the evidence show or tend 
to show that the defendant knew or in the exercise 
of ordinary care should have known of the defective 
condition of the chair and thereafter failed to repair 
or remove it from his place of business. 
"In this case, knowledge is an essential element 
of negligence. * * * We think that an instruc-
tion embracing this thought was necessary and 
should have been given." 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDI-
CIAL ERROR IN ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
WHICH INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON A 
THEORY CONTRARY TO AND NOT SUP-
PORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Instruction No. 7 reads as follows: 
"If you find by a preponderance of the evidence 
that it was the custom and practice of the defendant 
company, through its employees other than the plain-
tiff, to shut off the steam at the intermediate valve, 
or that in the exercise of reasonable care for plain-
tiff's safety under the circun1stances of this case 
it was defendant's dut~· so to do, and further find 
from a preponderance of the evidence that the de-
fendant company failed so to do, then you may find 
that the defendant company was negligent in this 
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regard ; and if you further find from a preponder-
ance of the evidence that such conduct upon the part 
of the defendant proximately caused in whole or in 
part injuries to the plaintiff, then you should return 
a verdict in favor of plaintiff and against the de-
fendant, and award to plaintiff damages as in those 
instructions set forth." 
This instruction permitted the jury to find that it was 
the custom and practice or duty of the defendant company, 
under the circumstances of this case, to shut off the steam 
at tlle intermediate valve through employees other than 
plaintiff. The error is that said theory is not supported 
by any competent evidence. There was no evidence offered 
or received at the trial proving or tending to prove that it 
was the custom and practice or duty of the defendant com-
pany, under the circumstances, to shut off the steam at the 
intermediate valve through an employee other than plain-
tiff. A review of the testimony compels this conclusion. 
Plaintiff was the first witness called in support of his 
case. Plaintiff expressly denied any knowledge of the ex-
istence or function of the intermediate valve. There is 
nothing in his testimony to establish a custom and prac-
tice by defendant or a duty to turn off the intermediate 
valve under such circumstances. The pertinent parts of 
plaintiff's testimony are as follows (R. 50, 51, 52, 70, 71, 
72, 130, 131) : 
(Cross-Examination) 
"Q. Now, there is another valve, is there not, 
Mr. Heywood, which is some distance from this par-
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ticular valve, which is along the line, which is cus-
tomarily turned off when you work on this hammer, 
is it not? 
"A. No, sir. 
"Q. Isn't it a fact, Mr. Heywood, that on other 
occasions when you have worked on this hammer 
you have had this particular valve, which is some 
distance back, turned off besides having the valve 
at the hammer turned off? 
"A. No, sir. 
"Q. Do you know the valve I am speaking of? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. And that is a valve that is some distance 
away which is called a master valve, I think. 
"A. That's right. 
"Q. And when you turn that master valve off, 
why, then you don't have any steam anywhere near 
the hammer on which you are working, do you? 
"A. Now here in the blacksmith shop. 
"Q. In other words-Well, that particular 
valve that I am speaking about, that's in the black-
smith shop, comes only to this hammer, does it not? 
"A. \Vbich valve are you talking about? 
"Q. A valve that is about forty feet to the 
north-
" A. No. 
"Q. -and up to the top. 
''A. (\Vitness shakes head in the negative.) 
"Q. You don't know of such a valve, Mr. Hey-
wood? 
"A. I do not. 
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"Q. And it isn't a fact that you, on other oc-
casions, along with your helper, have turned off 
that valve before you worked on this hammer? 
"A. No, sir. 
"Q. And you don't know of such a valve at 
all? 
"A. No, sir. 
"Q. Isn't there also a valve that comes only 
to this hammer that's up near the ceiling? 
"A. I do not know of one. 
"Q. You don't know of that valve? 
"A. No, sir. 
"Q. (By Mr. Ashton) Then you have no rec-
ollection, as I understand it, Mr. Heywood, of a main 
steam valve, which is up near where this pipe runs 
along the top of the blacksmith shop, which is about 
thirty or forty feet to the north of this valve that 
you operated? 
"A. On the same line? 
"Q. Yes, sir. 
"A. No, sir. 
"Q. And you have never worked that partic-
ular valve? 
"A. No, sir. 
"Q. And you have never requested the steam-
fitters or pipefitters to work that valve for you 
when you have worked on this equipment on other 
occasions? 
"A. No, sir; not on this particular equipment. 
"Q. That's the equipment I am talking about. 
"A. That's right. 
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"Q. And you say that it is the rule that this 
other valve be turned off? 
"A. No, it isn't the rule. 
"Q. I understood you to say that was the rule 
but not the practice. 
"A. No. No, it's-In working a machine, you 
generally turn off the valve that shuts the steam to 
the machine which you're working. 
"Q. I understand that. And are you not also 
supposed, according to the rule, to turn off the main 
valve which leads steam into that machine? 
"A. No, sir. 
"Q. And you have never done that? 
"A. No, sir. The main valve takes the steam 
out of the shop. 
"Q. And you don't know the valve that simply 
takes the steam a way from this particular machine? 
"A. Only that one valve. 
"Q. Only this one valve? 
"A. That's right. 
"Q. You know of no other? 
"A. No, sir." 
(Re-direct Examination) 
"Q. ::Mr. Heywood, before yesterday, during 
the course of the trial, had you ever had knowledge 
of another valve, other than the valve that you used 
on this occasion, between that valve and the main 
shutoff valve that shuts down the whole shop? 
"A. No, sir. 
"Q. Had you ever had such a valve pointed out 
to you? 
"A. No, sir. 
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"Q. The only valve you have ever seen turned 
off was this one on that particular machine? 
"A. When I was working that particular ma-
chine, yes. 
"Q. Have you ever seen any other valves 
turned off? 
"A. There is valves to each one of those steam 
hammers, and there is four, and I have had occasion 
to have them all turned off. 
"Q. You have never seen where the intermed-
iate valve turns off? 
"A. No. 
"Q. You have never seen them since 1922, the 
years you have been there? 
"A. No. 
"Q. And you didn't know they existed? 
"A. No." 
The second witness who testified for plaintiff was Mr. 
Griffiths, a blacksmith in defendant's shop called by plain-
tiff. The only inference that can be drawn from Mr. Grif-
fith's testimony is that plaintiff should have arranged him-
self, under the circumstances, to have the valve shut off. 
Mr. Griffith's testimony in that connection is as follows 
(R. 94, 95) : 
"Q. Was the main valve turned off in this case, 
do you know? 
"A. No, it wasn't. 
"Q. In other words, an improper practice was 
followed by turning only the valve off by the ham-
mer? 
"A. Well, I would say so, yes. 
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"Q. And who was the person who turned that 
valve off? 
"A. Well, I think the proper procedure would 
have been for the mechanic working on the job to 
notify the foreman that the steam should be turned 
off. 
"Q. And you know that the steam was not 
turned off on this occasion, was it? 
"A. No. 
"Q. So that in this particular instance, any-
way, so far as you are concerned, an improper pro-
cedure was followed by not turning off the main 
valve of the steam? 
"A. I would say yes to that. 
"Q. Now, who is the person who usually de-
termines whether the steam is to be turned off-
the mechanic doing the work? 
"A. Well. he would naturally be the individual 
to determine whether the steam should be turned 
off. 
"Q. And how does he go to the foreman and 
ask that it be turned off? 
"A. If I were in his position, that's exactly 
what I would do. 
"Q. Yes. And that was not done in this case. 
"A. Not to my knowledge." 
The third witness to testify was Joseph L. Crowton, 
a pipefitter, called by plaintiff. Mr. Crowton testified that 
the intermediate valve would not be used under the cir-
cumstances involved in this case. 
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Direct Examination (R. 106): 
"Q. Now, if work is being done on the pipes 
or the fittings on the single arch steam hammer, 
what shutoff valve is used, to your knowledge? 
"A. The one shown on your photo there, on 
your picture there. 
"Q. Is there another shutoff valve somewhere 
back along that main line? 
"A. Yes, sir; about twelve inches, approxi-
mately-that could vary a little-from where the 
three-inch line takes off of the main six-inch line 
in the roof of the blacksmith shop. 
"Q. Now, what is that shutoff valve used for? 
"A. Well, if there's anything needs to be re-
paired on that line between there and the hammer, 
and actually you'd have to shut it off up at the main 
steam line, which this valve is located, to work on the 
line from there down. 
"Q. And from the steam valve that is indi-
cated in the photograph, on down, which valve would 
be used? 
"A. The steam hammer itself, I would say the 
valve right there in the picture. It's just close to 
the steam hammer." 
Redirect Examination (R. 132) : 
"Q. Mr. Crowton, yesterday you were asked 
some questions by counsel, on cross examination, 
pertaining to the possibility of a leak in the valve 
that is next to the stuffing box, and what you would 
do in case there was such leak. Will you elaborate 
on that and explain what you meant? 
"A. Yes. The valve down by the hammer, the 
one shown on the picture closest to the hammer, I 
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said anything that connected directly with the ham-
mer, or smaller pipes, condensate pipes, we call 
them, that lead from the hammer down, that would 
be all that would be necessary to shut that valve off. 
"If you had a pipe you had to screw out directly, 
of that valve, it wouldn't be safe to do it, then you 
would go to the upper valve shutoff. 
"If there was leakage between the lower valve 
and the upper valve, you would shut the upper valve 
off. 
"Quite often the valves leak in the packing 
glands in the valves itself. You could not repair that 
packing in that valve safely, without going to the 
upper valve to turn it off. Other than that I would 
say ordinary work on the hammer itself would be 
taken care of by just turning the lower valve off. 
You wouldn't gain anything by turning the upper 
valve off, as far as safety, if the valve was off. 
"As long as a valve shuts off tight behind your 
work, so you can work, there is no necessity going 
along the line shutting all the valves off." 
The only other witnesses, except medical, who testified 
were two employees called as vd.tnesses by the defendant. 
They were Mr. Aberton and Mr. Schenk. Their testimony 
does not support the theory contained in said instruction. 
In view of the foregoing, it is clear that there was no com-
petent evidence to support the theory contained in said 
instruction. 
Even assuming, however, that an inference could be 
drawn from the testimony to establish the custom and prac-
tice referred to in said instruction, the issue should not 
have been submitted to the jury. The rule has been well 
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settled and frequently stated by this Court that a party is 
not entitled to go to the jury on an issue unless that part 
of his own testimony or the testimony of his witness which 
is least favorable to his contention, is of such a character 
as will sustain a verdict in his favor on that issue. Harley 
Benson v. The D. & R. G. W. Co., 4 Utah 2d 38, 286 P. 2d 
790. Alvarado v. Tucker, 2 Utah 2d 16, 268 P. 2d 986, 
Fowler v. Pleasant Valley Coal Co., 16 Utah 348, 52 Pac. 
594. 
The testimony of the plaintiff and his witness Crowton 
positively denied that the intermediate valve would be used 
under the circumstances of this case. In view of that testi-
mony and under the foregoing decisions, plaintiff was not 
entitled to go to the jury on that issue. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDI-
CIAL ERROR IN ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
WHICH INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON A 
THEORY NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVI-
DENCE. 
Instruction No. 8 reads as follows : 
"You are instructed that an employer has a duty 
to inspect equipment used by its employees when it 
knows or in the exercise of reasonable care should 
have known of an unsafe condition in said equip-
ment. 
"If you shall find from a preponderance of the 
evidence that defendant knew or in the exercise of 
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reasonable care should have known when it found 
the steam leak that there might be an unsafe con-
dition existing in the steam pipe in the stuffing box, 
then you may find that defendant was under a duty 
in the exercise of reasonable care to make an inspec-
tion of said pipe to determine whether an unsafe 
condition actually existed, and if you further find 
by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant 
failed to inspect said pipe and that such failure to 
inspect proximately caused, in whole or in part, in-
juries to plaintiff, then you should return a verdict 
in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant 
and award to plaintiff damages as in these instruc-
tions set forth." 
The theory expressed in this instruction is that the 
defendant had a duty to inspect the pipe in question after 
a leak was discovered and that if it failed to exercise reason-
able care in said inspection it was negligent. Defendant 
has no quarrel with the proposition that the defendant had 
a duty to exercise reasonable care in making an inspection 
of the pipe in question. It is defendant's contention, how-
ever, that it fully discharged the said duty. 
The testimony should be reviewed to determine what 
action the defendant took in discharge of its duty to inspect. 
The steam leak in question was discovered on the morn-
ing of the accident by lVfr. Griffiths, a blacksmith (R. 87). 
Mr. Griffiths promptly notified the Foreman, Schenk, of 
the leak (R. 87). Foreman Schenk asked plaintiff to repair 
the leak. As previously stated, the plaintiff had worked as 
a machinist in the shops since November 19, 1922 (R. 14). 
Plaintiff was a trouble shooter (R. 15). The plaintiff had 
performed the same type of work on numerous occasions 
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(R. 29). It was the testimony of Foreman Schenk that 
it was plaintiff's duty in the first instance to determine 
what had to be done (R. 151). 
The following testimony of plaintiff is important on 
the issue of inspection (R. 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 85) : 
"Q. Well, don't you inspect work that you do, 
Mr. Heywood, to see if you have completed it satis-
factorily? 
"A. After the job is completed, I always see 
that it's okeh. 
"Q. In other words, whenever you go to repair 
something, particularly something that has to be 
taken apart to repair, one of your duties is to in-
spect the work you do for the purpose of determin-
ing whether or not it has been completed satisfact-
ory, isn't it? 
"A. That's right, yes sir. 
"Q. In other words, that's one of the things 
that a mechanic always does when he repairs a 
broken part, is to inspect a thing that he's trying 
to correct, and inspect the work he's done, for the 
purpose of seeing if he has corrected the trouble; 
that's right, isn't it? 
"A. To a certain extent, that's correct. 
"Q. Well, now, Mr. Heywood, when you went 
up to look at this particular pipe, you say that you 
were engaged as sort of a trouble-shooter, is that 
right? 
"A. That's right. 
"Q. In other words, one of the things you were 
to do when they found some trouble was to go up and 
find out what the trouble was, was it not? 
"A. That's right. 
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"Q. And then correct the trouble; that's right, 
isn't it? 
"A. That's right. 
"Q. And when you saw this particular pipe, 
you say it had a bad leak in it? 
"A. Steam leak. 
"Q. And when you saw that it had a bad leak 
you knew there was something wrong, did you not? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And what are the things that cause pipe 
to leak, Mr. Heywood? 
"A. As your stuffing box packing has come 
loose. 
"Q. And if the flange on the pipe concealed in 
this stuffing box is also broken, that will cause a 
leak, will it not? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Well, did you make any attempt to ascer-
tain whether or not the flange on this particular 
pipe was broken at the time you opened it? 
"A. No, sir. 
"Q. Well, how would you eliminate the possi-
bility of that flange being broken if you made no 
attempt to ascertain whether it was broken or not? 
"A. Because it just needed new packing. 
"Q. 'Veil, then, Mr. Heywood, you say you 
made no effort when you \Yere up there to inspect 
this particular flange to see if it was broken. 
"A. That's right. 
"Q. Well, Mr. Heywood, did you make any 
inspection to see if that was the condition that was 
existing in that pipe? 
"A. No, sir. 
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"Q. (By Mr. Ashton) Is there ever a better 
opportunity to inspect equipment that must be dis-
mantled than when you have it dismantled so that 
you can look into it? 
"A. That is the opportune time, I guess. 
"Q. Did you make an inspection at that time? 
"A. No, sir. 
"Q. Did you ask anybody to make an inspec-
tion at that time? 
"A. No, sir. 
"Q. You just put it back together, Mr. Hey-
wood? 
"A. That's right. 
"Q. Do you know anybody down at that shop 
who is more qualified to inspect and look at this 
equipment for the purpose of determining whether 
or not there's some trouble there than you? 
"A. That's up to the supervisor. 
"Q. No, no. I asked if you know anybody who 
is more qualified than you-
"A. No. 
"Q. Did you ever go in to the supervisor on 
any occasion and tell him that you think the steam-
fitter ought to check with you to see if this is okey? 
"A. On a lot of jobs, yes, sir. 
"Q. Did you ever on this job? 
"A. No, sir. 
"Q. On no occasion? 
"A. No, sir." 
The conclusion is inescapable from the foregoing testi-
mony that defendant exercised all care and prudence which 
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could be required of it under the circumstances. The very 
purpose for which plaintiff was sent to the single arch 
hammer was to determine the cause of the steam leak and 
correct it. No one was in a better position to make an 
inspection than plaintiff. No other employee possessed the 
knowledge that plaintiff did regarding the condition of the 
pipe. It was plaintiff who attempted to tighten the flange; 
it was plaintiff who replaced the packing. If anyone should 
have known of the condition, it was plaintiff. Admittedly, 
the plaintiff failed to make the type of inspection required 
to determine the trouble. Plaintiff's failure could not furn-
ish the basis for defendant's liability, however. 
The novel theory advanced by plaintiff at the time of 
trial and incorporated in Instruction Number 8 was that 
the defect in question could not have been discovered except 
by removing the pipe in question; that the work of remov-
ing said pipe was that of a pipe fitter; that an inspection 
of said pipe should have been made by a pipe fitter. The 
difficulty with this argument is that it ignores the facts. 
The evidence is uncontradicted that it was plaintiff's re-
sponsibility in the first instance to determine the nature of 
the trouble. There is no evidence that plaintiff ever re-
quested or suggested that a pipe fitter inspect the pipe. 
Plaintiff admitted that he had made no request for a pipe 
fitter. There is no evidence that plaintiff's work had 
progressed to the point or that the nature of the trouble 
was such that defendant knew or in the exercise of reason-
able care should have known that a pipe fitter was re-
quired. Certainly the defendant could not be held negligent 
for failure to furnish a pipe fitter in the absence of evidence 
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that defendant knew or should have known that a pipe 
fitter was required. Defendant had the right to assume 
that if a pipe fitter was needed, plaintiff would ask for one. 
Plaintiff, who had the burden of proof, offered no 
evidence and none was received that it was the custom and 
practice to send a pipe fitter in advance of or along with 
plaintiff under such circumstances. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDI-
CIAL ERROR IN ITS REFUSAL AND FAIL-
URE TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 1, 8 AND 11 OR SOME 
INSTRUCTION SETTING FORTH IN FULL 
THE THEORIES CONTAINED THEREIN. 
The only charges given by the Court pertaining to the 
defense of contributory ne,gligence are contained in the 
court's instructions Nos. 9 and 10. Those instructions are 
of limited effect. Instruction No. 9 charges the jury on 
the duty of turning off the intermediate valve or requesting 
that such valve be turned off. Instruction No. 10 is re-
stricted to plaintiff's duty to discover the defect in the 
steam pipe. 
Neither of said instructions charges the jury on the 
theory that plaintiff had a duty to request and arrange for 
a pipe fitter to inspect the pipe and to remove the pipe. 
This theory became a very material matter in the trial. 
It was plaintiff's contention that the defect in the pipe 
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could not have been discovered except by removing the 
pipe and that the work of removing the pipe was that of a 
pipe fitter. Instruction No. 8, discussed hereinabove, ex-
pressly charged the jury on the issue of defendant's negli-
gence in failing to inspect the pipe after the steam leak was 
discovered. 
It was the defendant's contention that if a pipe fitter 
was required to make an inspection or to remove the pipe 
that a request should have been made by plaintiff for a 
pipe fitter. There was evidence to support defendant's 
theory. Defendant's witness, Schenk, testified that between 
a machinist and pipe fitter, it was the machinist's job, in 
the first instance, to inspect the machine to determine what 
had to be done (R. 151, 157). Plaintiff himself testified 
that on a lot of jobs he had asked the supervisor to have 
a steam fitter check with him (R. 85). Plaintiff admitted 
that he had never done so on the occasion in question (R. 
85) . In view of the foregoing evidence, defendant was 
entitled to have the theory submitted to the jury that plain-
tiff was negligent in failing to request or arrange for a 
steam fitter. The jury might well have found, had the 
same been submitted, that plaintiff was negligent in failing 
to request or await the assistance of a steam fitter. The 
general instructions on contributory negligence requested 
by defendant would have covered the said theory. The in-
structions given by the Court failed to present said theory. 
Defendant submits that it was prejudicial error for the 
Court to fail and refuse to submit said theory to the jury 
either in the requested instructions or in some part of the 
charge. 
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POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDI-
CIAL· ERROR IN FAILING AND REFUSING 
TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED IN-
STRUCTION NO. 6 OR SOME OTHER IN-
STRUCTION INCORPORATING THE THEORY 
CONTAINED THEREIN. 
Defendant's requested Instruction No. 6 contains a 
correct statement of the law applicable to the facts of this 
case. The requested instruction is almost identical with an 
instruction which was approved by this court in the recent 
case, Bowden v. The Denver & Rio Grande Western Rail-
road Co., supra. The court stated in that decision its recog-
nition of the necessity of actual or constructive knowledge 
of an unsafe condition in order to charge the defendant with 
liability. 
It was particularly important to the defendant under 
the facts of this case that the elements set forth in re-
quested Instruction No. 6 be submitted to the jury. The 
nature of the equipment and the defects were such that the 
jury might well have found that the defendant did not know 
and in the exercise of reasonable care would not have known 
that an unsafe condition existed. There was abundant evi-
dence from which the jury could have concluded that the 
defendant did not know and would not, in the exercise of 
reasonable care, have known of an unsafe condition. Defen-
dant was entitled to have this important requisite submitted 
to the jury. The Court's charge to the jury, as given, was 
devoid of any statement requiring that the jury find that 
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the defendant knew or in the exercise of reasonable care 
should have known of an unsafe condition. To the further 
prejudice of defendant, the Court's Instruction No. 6 ex-
pressly eliminated the necessity of such knowledge on the 
part of the defendant. 
In addition to the Bowden case, the following decisions 
hold that knowledge of an unsafe condition is an essential 
element of liability under such circumstances. 
Seaboard Airline Railway v. Horton, supra, 
Atlantic Coastline Railroad Co. v. Dixon, supra, 
Hat field v. Thompson, supra, 
Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Burks, supra, 
Stevens v. Mirakian, supra. 
In each of the three latter decisions, the Court held that it 
was prejudicial error not to instruct the jury as to the 
necessity for finding that the defendant had knowledge of 
the defective or unsafe condition. The pertinent parts of 
the said opinions are set out above. 
It was equally important that the second element set 
forth in defendant's requested Instruction No. 6 be given 
to the jury. It is not every unsafe condition nor every 
defect in equipment which gives rise to liability on the part 
of an employer. There are always unsafe conditions exist-
ing in industrial shops such as railroad blacksmith shops. 
Railroading is itself a hazardous business. Many unsafE 
conditions cannot be eliminated even through the exerciSE 
of reasonable care. This is particularly true of a defect ir 
equipment which arises and is discovered during the coursE 
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of its operation as in this case. The law seems well settled 
that in order to render a defendant railroad liable for an 
unsafe condition, it must be found that the condition gave 
rise to an unreasonable risk of harm. This element of lia-
bility was recognized by the Court in the Bowden case. 
This requirement was not set forth in any of the Court's 
instructions to the jury. Defendant contends that it was 
entitled to have this theory submitted to the jury. 
There can be little controversy over the proposition 
that when an unsafe or defective condition not previously 
known arises in a piece of machinery or equipment that 
.a defendant railroad has a reasonable period of time within 
which to correct the condition without subjecting itself to 
liability therefor. This element was also included in the 
instruction considered by this Court in the Bowden case 
.and recognized by the Court as proper. It is particularly 
applicable to the facts of this case inasmuch as the condi-
tion in the single arch hammer arose during its operation 
and steps were taken by the defendant to correct the con-
dition. The Court's instructions to the jury did not set 
forth this element. 
It is defendant's contention that its requested Instruc-
tion No. 6, as a whole, contains a correct statement of the 
law and was particularly applicable to the evidence in this 
case. Failure to give said instruction deprived defendant 
of an important part of its defense. Defendant was denied 
the right to have its theory of the case presented to the 
jury. The error in failing to give this instruction was ag-
gravated by the Court's Instruction No. 6 which eliminated 
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all of the elements set forth in the requested instruction 
from consideration by the jury and made the sole issue 
whether or not the place of work was unsafe. 
POINT VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDI-
CIAL ERROR IN FAILING AND REFUSING 
TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED IN-
STRUCTION NO. 2. 
It was the defendant's theory that the defect which 
caused plaintiff's accident and injuries was latent; that 
said defect could not have been discovered by the usual 
and ordinary examinations employed by railroads in the 
exercise of reasonable care. This theory was supported by 
competent evidence. Both the plaintiff and other witnesses 
testified that the defect could not be discovered except by 
disconnecting the pipe into the stuffing box and examining 
the same. The defect was in fact not discovered by plaintiff. 
Under these circumstances defendant contended that 
it was entitled to an instruction charging the jury that it 
was not required to employ or adopt extraordinary or un-
reasonable tests or examinations to discover defects, but 
fulfilled its duty by adopting such tests and examination 
procedure as ordinarily used by prudently conducted rail-
roads. The purpose of such instruction was to advise the 
jury that the railroad was not under a duty to periodically 
dismantle and examine extensive steam lines. This theory 
was incorporated in defendant's requested Instruction No. 
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2. There is authority to support the propriety of such an 
instruction : 
Texas and Pacific Railroad Co. v. Barrett, 166 
U. S. 617, 17 S. Ct. 707, 
Lowden v. Hanson, 134 F. 2d 348 (C. C. A. 8th 
1943)' 
Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Coughlin, 132 
Fed. 801 (C. C. A. 6th 1904). 
The trial court's instructions to the jury failed to present 
this theory. Defendant contends that it was entitled to 
have the theory presented either in the form submitted or 
elsewhere in the court's charge. 
POINT VII. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED 
VERDICT; THE EVIDENCE COMPELS THE 
CONCLUSION THAT PLAINTIF'F WAS NEG-
LIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW AND THAT 
HIS NEGLIGENCE WAS THE SOLE PROXI-
MATE CAUSE OF HIS ACCIDENT AND IN-
JURIES. 
No useful purpose would be served by repeating or 
reiterating the evidence which has been set out above. It 
is the defendant's contention that the great weight of the 
evidence compels the conclusion that plaintiff was negligent 
as a matter of law and that his negligence was the sole 
proximate cause of his accident and injuries. 
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It is clear from the evidence that plaintiff's accident 
and injuries were caused by an old latent defect between 
the collar and pipe concealed by the single arch hammer 
stuffing box. Defendant discharged its duty to inspect and 
correct said condition by sending plaintiff, a trouble shooter, 
senior machinist and an experienced employee, to correct 
the condition. The failure to correct the condition was 
negligence on the part of plaintiff. Plaintiff was in the best 
possible position to ascertain the trouble and appreciate 
the danger. Plaintiff took it upon himself to turn in the 
steam without having corrected or repaired the defect. 
Plaintiff attempted to avoid responsibility in this con-
nection by contending that the inspection should have been 
made by a pipe fitter. This contention is unworthy of con-
sideration. It is beyond all reasonable standards to require 
a railroad to furnish an inspector for an inspector or to 
furnish assistance to an experienced employee who has not 
requested or made it known that he desires assistance. The 
conclusion is therefore inescapable that plaintiff himself 
was negligent and that his negligence was the sole proxi-
mate cause of his accident and injuries. 
In view of the foregoing, the court should have granted 
defendant's motion for a directed verdict. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant submits that the trial court committed 
trejudicial error in its instructions to the jury and its 
ailure to charge the jury in accordance with defendant's 
·equested instructions ; that the court erred in denying 
Lefendant's motion for a directed verdict. On the basis of 
;he foregoing, defendant respectfully urges that the judg-
nent below be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY, 
LEONARD J. LEWIS, 
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON, 
Counsel for Appellant. 
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